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Aristotle and the Eternal Caterpillar
George Couvalis and Suzanne Roux
Design arguments are arguments from apparent purposiveness to the conclusion 
that there is an intelligent deliberating being who planned the order in the world. 
Socrates and Plato put such arguments. Empedocles, Democritus and Epicurus 
argue that all such purposiveness, except for the action of intelligent beings like 
humans or gods, is only apparent. We point out that both camps share the common 
assumption that all cases of working for the sake of something involve intelligent 
deliberation. Using Aristotle, we argue that this assumption is false. Unintelligent 
creatures can act for the sake of something. We use this argument and Aristotle’s 
further remarks to also argue that this shows that if there were a designer of the 
universe which acted for the sake of producing living things, it might well be an 
unintelligent designer, like an eternal caterpillar. 
Introduction
Design arguments are ancient. Th ey are arguments from apparent purposiveness 
in the biological and non-biological world to the conclusion that there is an intel-
ligent deliberating being who planned the order in the world. Xenophon puts a 
design argument into the mouth of Socrates (Memorabilia I, iv, 1–10).1 Plato hints 
at a design argument in the Timaeus. He explains the cosmic order through the 
imitation of an eternal model. By following the eternal model, a divine being he 
calls the dimiourgos (maker) has created order in the world out of an originally 
chaotic material. On Plato’s account, the dimiourgos created functionally organised 
creatures whose organs are fi nely structured to work together so as to help them 
survive, via a world psyche (soul) and daimones (lesser divinities). Plato sometimes 
presents his ideas about the dimiourgos as a mythos (story). Th e mythos may not 
be intended to be precisely true. Nevertheless, it seems that he thinks the only plau-
sible explanation for the ubiquity of kosmos (order) in the world, including appar-
ent biological purposiveness, is that something like the dimiourgos exists. 
1 We have followed the normal convention of referring to passages in Xenophon, which is to refer to 
sections of the edition of the complete works of Xenophon compiled by Sauppe. 
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An assumption behind such ac counts is 
that deliberation, planning and skilful ac-
tivity is very diff erent from the in stinctual 
activities of humble living things such as 
spiders or vegetables. Th e instinctual activi-
ties of vegetables and spiders are not a form 
of properly intelligent behaviour. So, if there 
is a dimiourgos, it is not like them. Th is as-
sumption is intuitively plausible though it is 
not beyond challenge. We will accept it for 
the purposes of this paper.
We should note here that Socrates and 
Plato are not thinking of the origin of the 
universe here. Greek thinkers of this time 
typically take it for granted that the universe 
has always existed. Th ey are interested in the 
origins of order.
Attempts to explain apparent pur po si-
veness without invoking a designer are also 
ancient. Empedocles attempted to explain it in the plant and animal world via three 
factors: the random production of whole body parts by the earth, an attractive force 
that brought those parts together, and natural selection, which quickly winnowed 
out creatures that were not well adapted to their environment. (Th e idea that evolu-
tion might play a part does not seem to have occurred to Empedocles.) Democritus 
attempted to explain all kinds of apparent order by invoking the random movement of 
atoms. Aft er Aristotle, Epicurus and Lucretius seems to have tried to marry Democ-
ritus and Empedocles and add a small amount of evolution within species (Campbell, 
2004:145–180). On the account of all of these thinkers, what was thought to be pur-
posiveness in the biological world is only apparent purposiveness. Th e human body 
is not really a system that has been produced by a designer. Further, the human body 
is not a system working for the sake of an end. It only appears to be such a system. 
Th e Crucial Assumptions
It is important to spell out some assumptions that underlie the debate between the 
line of argument of Socrates and Plato and the line of argument of Empedocles, 
Democritus and Epicurus. Assumption A is: Th ere are only two plausible possibilities. 
Th e two possibilities are: P1) all apparent purposiveness in the world is the result of 
conscious deliberation; and P2) apart from what is produced by conscious deliberation 
in higher animals, the apparent purposiveness in the world is to be explained solely by 
factors which do not work for the sake of (or towards) ends. (By factors which do not 
work for the sake of [or towards] ends, we mean factors like the forces which move 
Aristotle (384–322 BC).
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atoms or those which are involved in natural selection.) Some argue that P1 is more 
plausible and some that P2 is more plausible. Nevertheless, both sides assume that 
these are the only possibilities worth debating. We will see that Aristotle showed 
that A is mistaken. 
Underlying A is a further assumption B, which is that if X happens for the sake 
of Y, some intelligent deliberating thing is (or must be) bringing about X for the sake 
of Y. Note that B is not an assumption about the meaning of words. It is not being 
said that that we typically use “for the sake of ” in a way which implies intelligence 
and deliberation. If that were what was being said, B would be trivial. But it is 
not trivial. It is a substantive thesis about the nature of what Aristotle calls “to hou 
eneka” (“the for the sake of ”). Th ose who adhere to assumption B in the debates 
we are discussing are providing part of a real and not merely nominal account of 
what is involved in instances of “the for the sake of ”. Th at is, they are making claims 
about what is involved universally in something being for the sake of something 
else. (Aristotle would also say that they are making claims about what is involved as 
a matter of natural necessity.) For an analogous case, consider someone in a scien-
tifi c context saying that if X is a metal it is (or must be) a solid at room temperature. 
She is not talking about the use of the word “metal”. She is talking about the prop-
erties of all metals. In fact her claim is false as some metals are not solids at room 
temperature, even if stereotypic metals are. We will also challenge assumption B as 
an account of reality by relying on Aristotle, though we will not be entering into a 
discussion of his much debated account of natural necessity here.2
Aristotle’s System of the World
Before we start our discussion of some key arguments in Aristotle, let us clear 
up some possible misconceptions. What we have said about Aristotle may seem 
strange to those who know that Aristotle believes there are gods. So let us turn to 
explaining some parts of Aristotle’s system. Aristotle conceives of things reproduc-
ing of their kind eternally. Th ere is no need for a dimiourgos in his system of the 
world in part because he thinks that the world is infi nite in time and the same 
species have existed eternally, each thing giving rise to descendants of its kind in a 
regular way. Th e natural tendencies of all things have always been there. His very 
neat dissolution of the problem of the origins of all kinds of order is not to invoke 
a mysterious dimiourgos. It is to extrapolate backwards in time from what we 
observe everyday. However, there are gods in his system. He thinks that observa-
tions shows that they need to be there to keep motions going in the sublunary 
realm in which motions come to end when a motive force ceases. Th e gods are 
part of a natural order that has always existed. Aristotle uses a natural teleology to 
2 Contrary to an earlier tradition, we interpret Aristotle as being interested in the nature of the world 
and not in the uses of words. For an interpretation of Metaphysics of this kind, see Politis, 2004.
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explain much that Plato’s unnatural teleology explains by postulating unnecessary 
unobservables such as the dimiourgos (Johansen, 2004:69–79). 
Since Newton, we have known that we do not need to invoke a heavenly realm 
with its own laws to keep motion going in the sublunary realm. (Newton’s First 
Law tells us that, contrary to Aristotle, a moving object not acted upon by a force 
will continue is straight line motion for ever.) We also know that the heavens are 
like the earth. So we now know that there is no need for Aristotle’s gods to explain 
motion in the sublunary sphere. Nevertheless, we know from the fossil record that 
currently existing living things have not reproduced of their kind eternally. On the 
contrary, they came into existence from much simpler living things. Probably the 
earliest living things came from non-living things. Further, as far as we can tell, the 
universe itself came into existence an immensely long time ago in the big bang. 
Does this mean that something like Plato’s dimiourgos can sneak back into the 
picture as the creator of the universe? Some thinkers have argued for theism by 
claiming that the initial conditions, materials and laws at the time of the big bang 
were precisely calibrated in order to produce life. Th is claim is widely rejected, but 
let us suppose it is true. Does it imply that the universe had an intelligent designer? 
By adapting Aristotle, we will see that it does not.
Aristotle’s Criticisms of Assumptions A and B
Aristotle’s criticisms of A and B are buried in a section of Physics in which his 
primary target is Empedocles. Against Empedocles, Aristotle’s central argument is 
that apparent purposiveness is ubiquitous in the biological world, and we cannot 
explain why it is present always or usually without assuming that the parts of a 
process or the parts of a body really are present for the sake of an end (telos). For 
instance, the fact that in all normal human beings and in many other kinds of ani-
mals the back teeth come up in manner suitable for grinding and the front teeth 
come up in a manner suitable for breaking up food is to be explained by the ends 
of survival and reproduction (198b:23–199a:5).3 Speaking of the development of 
organisms, Aristotle declares that where there is an end in view, the earlier and suc-
cessive parts of processes of development work for the sake of (eneka prattetai) the 
end (199a:8). Such arguments were adequately rebutted by Darwinists. We do not 
need to pursue the details here. 
Th e target of much of Aristotle’s subsequent discussion is unclear. However, 
some of his arguments are directed at those who hold assumption B. Th ese argu-
ments would not only serve as a good critique of Empedocles, but also of Socrates 
and Plato. 
3 We have followed the normal convention of referring to passages in Aristotle, which is refer to line 
numbers in the standard edition of the works of Aristotle, edited by Bekker.
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Aristotle’s First Argument
Th e fi rst argument uses observations of the animal and plant world to make a cru-
cial point about “the for the sake of ”. Th e highly organised structure and behaviour 
of simple animals and plants can only be properly explained by assuming that, due 
to their intrinsic nature, they work for the sake of something (survival and repro-
duction). Yet it is wrong to assume that they have skill (techne), inquire (zitisanta), 
or deliberate (vouleusamena), for they pretty clearly do not. Someone who thinks 
they do is faced with the absurd assumption that plants are intelligent deliberators, 
for it is clear they too work for the sake of an end (199a:21–30). 
Remember here that Aristotle assumes that he has ruled out a random proc-
ess and natural selection in his arguments against Empedocles. He thinks he has 
shown that to hou eneka cannot be explained as merely apparent. Talking in his 
way, he thinks he has already shown that the relation X is for the sake of Y is a genu-
ine and ubiquitous feature of the biological world. Here he is arguing that while 
“the for the sake of ” is genuine, it does not necessarily involve intelligent delib-
eration. Th is is illustrated by the fact that observation shows no sign of intelligent 
deliberation is involved in many instances. In our terms, assumption B is false.
Apply the point in the previous two paragraphs to arguments for a designer to 
see how someone infl uenced by Aristotle could criticize them. Suppose we think 
that there is evidence that the big bang was produced by something working 
towards an end. Suppose we also think that this thing existed before the universe 
existed and is eternal — it did not come into existence through a process involving 
random mutation and natural selection. Th ere is no more need to attribute skill, 
inquiry or deliberation to it than there is to attribute it to a plant. To attribute these 
things to it, we would need evidence that it does more than carry out a complex 
and structured routine directed to building a universe for the sake of producing 
living things. We now know that plants have intrinsic in them only an apparent 
“for the sake of ” which has arisen through evolution by natural selection. However, 
they might have had in them a true tendency to work “for the sake of ” transmitted 
through previous generations eternally. If they had this tendency, intelligent delib-
eration would not be a necessary part of it. We see that we have no reason to think 
that intelligent deliberation is a necessary part of “the for the sake of ”.
We should not be misled in our inquiries into nature by the fact that we oft en 
use the words “for the sake of ” in contexts which involve intention any more than 
we should be misled by the fact that stereotypical metals are solids at room tem-
perature into thinking that Mercury is not a metal. Assumption A is also false. 
Aristotle’s Second Argument
In a second argument, Aristotle seems to be criticizing those who deny that there 
can be something working for the sake of something when they do not see that 
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thing deliberating (vouleusamenon). He says that skill (techne) does not deliber-
ate. (Presumably he is also assuming that no one would deny that skills in use are 
typically being directed towards some end.) He draws an analogy between the skill 
involved in ship building and what happens in nature. He also says that if ship 
building were intrinsic to wood, wood would naturally produce the same results 
that ship building does (199b:26–30). Some have found these remarks puzzling, but 
we do not. It is a very common for people who have acquired a skill not to think 
about what they are doing when they apply it. In ordinary talk we are struck by how 
“natural” their activity seems to be. Th e skill has become second nature to them so 
that it has become an almost automatic routine. A skilled driver who has driven 
a particular route many times does not think: “now I will turn the steering wheel 
to here and put my foot on the brake”. She may not even be aware of doing these 
things. Th ey just happen spontaneously. Further, a skilled driver may suddenly fi nd 
herself driving towards a place where she works even though it’s a holiday because 
she has done it so many times. Not only do the individual movements necessary 
to drive the car occur without deliberation which directs them to that end; she 
also has, without deliberation, worked for the sake of going to the place where she 
works. Aristotle is arguing that observation shows that nature is like the skilled 
driver we have described. Th e diff erence is presumably that some intelligent delib-
eration was involved when the skilled driver fi rst laid down these procedures and 
laid them down for the sake of an end.
It is possible that Aristotle is partly criticizing Plato in putting the argument 
described in the last paragraph. A dimiourgos is literally a craft sman, someone 
who has a great deal of techne. A craft sman who is, as it were, born highly skilled 
for ordering the world in the manner Plato assumes would not be a deliberating 
inquiring being. He would be like a vegetable or a spider. 
Plants and animals are structured by their natures which are passed on from 
their ancestors, to facilitate achieving an end. Th e process of development of ani-
mals, from egg like things to creatures with organs disposed in just the right way, 
and in just the right places, to facilitate survival, is not done through deliberation. 
Th e behaviour of simple animals and the doings of plants is for the sake of survival 
even though they do not deliberate. Applying this to arguments for a designer, if 
there were a designer, it might well be just doing what is natural in an instinctive 
way without deliberation or inquiry. Assumption A is false.
Aristotle’s Th ird Argument
In an earlier passage, Aristotle also says that creatures like humans which act skil-
fully, use skill (techne) in a way which mimics what nature does without them. Th is 
remark occurs in a passage in which he compares how living things work by skill 
or naturally. He says that if there were a naturally occurring house, it would hap-
pen in the same order as a house made by skill. Conversely skill either completes 
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what nature cannot complete or imitates nature (199a:15–17). We take it that part 
of what he means by this that a being acting skillfully must, at least largely, follow a 
pre-existing order of nature to be able to act at all.
Whatever we think of Aristotle’s claim that if there were a naturally occurring 
house, its production would follow the order in which it would be produced by 
skill, the converse point is very plausible. Armed with this point, we might say that 
if there were no order of nature before the dimiourgos got to work, he would be 
unable to do anything. To spell out why, consider how we deliberating creatures 
actually do things. We rely on our knowledge of how the world works to use our 
bodily organs or tools to manipulate the world to fi t our plans. Plans cannot do 
anything of their own accord and neither can planners. Aristotle is not here merely 
making a point which merely relies on experience. It is a point which seems true 
a priori. It is hard to see how an intelligent deliberating mind would be able to act 
on anything in a world in which there is no fundamental order. Its acts might well 
in one place produce one result and in another a completely diff erent result. Th e 
results produced could not, even in principle, be predicted. Th ey would also not be 
stable over time. If a pure mind tried to produce a clock, in a disordered world it 
might well end up producing a fi sh. Th e fi sh might well then turn into a house. It 
follows from his account that there cannot be a god who created the fundamental 
order in the world because a being can only act if there already is a fundamental 
order in the world. 
Of course, Aristotle does not think of the world as being covered by scientifi c 
laws in a modern sense. For him, the order of the world is the fact that things come 
in stable kinds which have an inherent tendency to do certain kinds of things or 
to become certain kinds of things. (Th ings have an inherent dynamis — power or 
potentiality.) Just as even a good scribe can fail to write properly sometimes, the ten-
dencies in things are sometimes not actualized (199a:33). Th e tendencies in things 
are only actualised for the most part. However, to modernise his point we only 
have to think of the order of the world as consisting of things which falling under 
scientifi c laws. Th ere are many modern accounts of the nature of scientifi c laws in 
the philosophical literature. Th e reader can choose whichever account she prefers.
Th e third argument does not rule out a dimiourgos bringing order to the world. 
It rules out a dimiourgos bringing fundamental order to the world. Something 
which brings about some order on the basis of a pre-existing order does not need 
to be an intelligent deliberator.
Th e Caterpillar at the Beginning of the Universe 
Consider caterpillars: they apparently make a very complicated hammock with the 
production consisting of many stages. Pierre Huber found that if you collected a 
caterpillar that had completed its hammock up until the sixth stage and put it into 
a hammock only completed to the third stage it would simply reperform the 4th, 
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5th and 6th stages, but if you did the reverse and collected a caterpillar from a 3rd 
stage hammock and introduced into a 6th stage hammock it started where it left  
off  at the 3rd stage. Th e apparent purposive behaviour does not appear to display 
intelligent deliberation (Darwin, 2003:225–6).
Suppose we think there must be or is very likely to be an eternal designer. All 
we know about it is that it engages in universe building activities from pre-existing 
materials according to pre-existing laws and carries out these tasks in fi ne grained 
way. (Argument 3 has shown us that this is best it could do.) We are not in a posi-
tion to interrupt its routine at any point to see whether it is an intelligent delibera-
tor. Going on the evidence we have, we should attribute only what is necessary to 
carry out its complex task. What is necessary is that it lay down a bunch of initial 
condition and law building routines using more fundamental laws and initial 
conditions. Th e simplest hypothesis consistent with the evidence is that it is like a 
caterpillar. To defend another hypothesis, we would need evidence of intelligence 
and deliberation. No such evidence has been provided to us and it is not clear how 
it could be. We can’t interrupt its routine to see what happens.
Using Aristotle, we can conclude that arguments for an intelligent deliberating 
designer on the basis of the data available to us will always be inconclusive.
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